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It is becoming increasingly appreciated that affective inﬂuences can contribute strongly
to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. However, much work is still needed to properly
characterize these inﬂuences and the mechanisms by which they contribute to cognitive
processing. An important question concerns the nature of emotional manipulations (i.e.,
direct induction of affectively valenced subjective experience) versus motivational manipulations (e.g., delivery of performance-contingent rewards and punishments) and their
impact on cognitive control. Empirical evidence suggests that both kinds of manipulations
can inﬂuence cognitive control in a systematic fashion, but investigations of both have
largely been conducted independently of one another. Likewise, some theoretical accounts
suggest that emotion and motivation may modulate cognitive control via common neural
mechanisms, while others suggest the possibility of dissociable inﬂuences. Here, we provide an analysis and synthesis of these various accounts, suggesting potentially fruitful
new research directions to test competing hypotheses.
Keywords: emotion, motivation, cognitive control, reward, dopamine

INTRODUCTION
Human nature is uniquely characterized by the ﬂexibility, complexity, and sophistication with which thought and behavior can
be deployed in the service of a goal. This ability is thought to
depend on cognitive control, a collection of mechanisms, including
perceptual selection, response biasing, and online maintenance of
contextual or goal information, by which the human cognitive system adaptively conﬁgures itself to optimally perform speciﬁc tasks
(Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver et al., 2002). Most of the goals
pursued in daily life are emotionally or motivationally meaningful – i.e., to obtain outcomes that are pleasurable or important
for survival, and avoid outcomes that are not. It has long been
understood that such affective signiﬁcance is central to determining the goals around which human behavior is organized;
indeed, impairments in affectively driven goal-pursuit may be a
critical component of a number of psychiatric disorders, such as
depression and schizophrenia (Pessoa, 2008). Consequently, the
psychological and neurobiological mechanisms by which affective
inﬂuences modulate cognitive control have become of major interest in recent years and continue to be an important emerging topic
of study.
Much of the experimental research examining how affect modulates cognitive control has involved one of two types of manipulations: emotional manipulations, in which affectively valenced
subjective experience is directly induced (e.g., through mood
inductions or exposure to emotional stimuli), or motivational
manipulations, where motivational state is altered through the
introduction of rewarding or punishing incentives. Both types
of manipulations are thought to carry affective signiﬁcance, and
both have been hypothesized to impact goal-pursuit and/or cognitive control. However, for the most part, these bodies of research
have been carried out independently of one another. In a recent
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review, Pessoa aimed to ameliorate this situation by considering
examples of both an emotional manipulation (threat) and a motivational manipulation (reward) on cognition within a common
conceptual framework (Pessoa, 2009). His review suggests that
both threat and reward operate in highly similar ways, impacting
cognitive performance at both perceptual and executive stages of
information processing. However, Pessoa acknowledges that emotion and motivation are broad constructs, the impacts of which
may not be comprehensively characterized by the phenomena of
threat and reward alone. In contrast, and as described further
below, other theories of emotion and motivation suggest the possibility of dissociations between the two constructs (e.g., “liking”
versus “wanting”; Berridge, 1996) but this remains an understudied issue. Thus, the goal of the present paper is to discuss more
explicitly existing theoretical accounts regarding the relationship
of emotion and motivation to cognitive control, examine how
they may relate to one another, and speculate on commonalities and differences in the mechanisms by which they operate.
We also suggest future research directions that could be pursued to clarify ambiguity regarding the emotion versus motivation
distinction.

EMOTION AND MOTIVATION: TERMINOLOGY AND
CONCEPTUALIZATION
Emotion and motivation are highly related constructs within the
domain of affect (Rolls, 2000; Lang and Bradley, 2008), but their
inﬂuences on cognition generally have not been explicitly considered in relation to one another. When examining the literature
regarding the impact of each on cognitive performance, it is important to provide working deﬁnitions of relevant terms, so as to begin
more carefully examining how these constructs may relate to one
another.
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One review suggests that emotions are best functionally deﬁned
as “psychological or physiological states that index occurrences of
value” (Dolan, 2002). As this description suggests, emotion is generally conceptualized as a construct that can be decomposed into
multiple subcomponents deﬁning the relation between individual
and environment. Davidson et al. (1990) suggest that emotions are
comprised of three elements: autonomic reactions, cognitions, and
behaviors. More recently, Roseman (2008) asserts that emotion
can be thought of as a syndrome of phenomenology (thought and
feeling qualities), physiology (neural, chemical, and other physical
responses in the brain and body), expressions (signs of emotion
state), behaviors (action tendencies or readinesses), and emotivations (characteristic goals that people want to attain when the
emotion is experienced). Gendron and Barrett (2009) similarly
claim that emotions are comprised of subprocesses, including an
affective and cognitive (e.g., situational construal) component,
and are highly contextualized in nature. Common to all of these
deﬁnitions is the idea that emotions are an affective experience
that can be characterized by physiological changes and deﬁned
by a cognitive construal of some kind. As states indexing occurrences of value, emotions have been proposed to carry functional
value in physiologically preparing the body for action, permitting
ﬂexibility of behavioral responses to reinforcing stimuli, facilitating communication and social bonding, and inﬂuencing cognitive
processes including evaluation, memory encoding, and memory
recall (Rolls, 2000).
Motivations are similar to emotions in that they also serve to
deﬁne the relation between the individual and the environment
(Roseman, 2008), but differ from emotions in being more tightly
linked to action and explicit goal associations; motivated action
can be thought of as behavior that is at least partly determined by
a desired and hedonically laden end-state (i.e., it is goal-directed).
Pessoa (2009) suggests that motivation can be commonly deﬁned
as what makes one work to obtain reward or to avoid punishment. Similarly, Roseman (2008) proposes that a motivation is
an internal state producing behavior which moves the individual toward desirable reference values or away from undesirable
reference values.
Carver suggests a useful distinction between the two constructs
as they relate to goals: while motivation may be the drive toward
goal fulﬁllment, emotion may be emergent from one’s sensed rate
of progress toward goals; the difference between one’s present status and one’s goal state is experienced as affect and may lead to
goal reprioritization in order to maximize goal fulﬁllment (Carver,
2006). Similarly, Rolls (2000) suggests that emotions are states
elicited by rewarding and punishing reinforcers of behavior. Likewise, Lang and Bradley (2008) claim appetitive and defense-related
brain circuits have evolved to cope with motivationally signiﬁcant stimuli in the environment; positive and negative emotion,
respectively, are associated with the experience of these brain circuits being activated. Thus, according to this general view, emotion
can be considered an emergent property of motivationally driven
neural activity. However, the Lang and Bradley view also suggests that emotion is highly characterized by hedonic experience,
which accordingly is also tied to the activation of motivational
neural circuitry. They postulate that “. . .evaluative reports of
pleasure/displeasure roughly index which motivational system is
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activated by a stimulus event (i.e., appetitive or defensive)” (Lang
and Bradley, 2008). Buck (2000) and Laming (2000), commenting on Rolls’ (2000) review of emotion and motivation, argue
that emotion and motivation cannot be considered separately of
one another: Laming (2000) argues that emotion is the subjective
experience of being motivated, thus there is no separation between
the two; Buck argues that motivation and emotion cannot be distinguished from one another if emotion is, as he describes, the
“manifestation or ‘read-out’ of motivated potential” (Buck, 2000).
A contrasting perspective can be drawn from the work of Kent
Berridge, which has highlighted the potential dissociation between
activation of motivational circuitry and the neural systems that
code for hedonic experience (Berridge, 1996, 2003; Berridge and
Robinson, 1998, 2003; Berridge et al., 2009). He proposes that
the hedonic (i.e., subjective experiences of pleasure/displeasure)
and motivational (i.e., attribution of incentive salience) facets of
reward, shorthanded as “liking” and “wanting” respectively, are
neurobiologically dissociable: evidence from rodents indicates that
hedonic activation may depend on opioid-related circuitry while
attribution of incentive salience may depend on the mesolimbic
and neostriatal dopamine (DA) systems. This work suggests that
the constructs of emotion and motivation might involve separable
neural mechanisms, and as such may have distinct inﬂuences on
cognitive processing.
Psychological accounts postulating theoretical distinctions
between emotion and motivation have been less common. However, Roseman (2008) has recently suggested key differences: while
both may lead to goal-directed action, he proposes several differences between emotion and motivation. Roseman argues that
motivations are speciﬁc, relatively deliberate, and associated with
a speciﬁc goal. In contrast, emotions are produced by multiple
contingencies, are somewhat more impulsive, and are not tightly
linked to a particular goal. Additionally, he suggests that emotions typically take precedence over motivations: speciﬁcally, by
engendering emotivations, emotion-speciﬁc motivations, that take
precedence over non-emotional motivations. These emotivations
could potentially be understood (in terms of Carver’s conceptualization of emotion) as a manifestation of goal reprioritization
resulting from emotion as an indicator of motivational status.
From these working deﬁnitions and theoretical accounts of the
relationship between emotion and motivation, we suggest that
an emotion may be presently considered a construct of multiple
processes that together serve to provide an index of value associated with an internal or externally experienced state. While a
motivation may be similarly comprised of multiple components,
a motivation should be considered a state that produces behavior
speciﬁcally oriented to carry out a goal that has hedonic value.
Thus, whereas an emotion may emerge from one’s status relative
to motivational goals, it may not necessarily be directly relevant to
a particular goal.
Examining the inﬂuences of emotion and motivation on cognitive performance may be fundamental to clarifying the relation
between these constructs; currently, however, these investigations
have been conducted largely in parallel. The goal of this paper is
to integrate these literatures by highlighting some key theoretical
accounts of emotional and motivational inﬂuences on cognition,
and illustrating where empirical evidence suggests these inﬂuences
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may diverge. To facilitate comparison between the emotional and
motivational literatures, we have chosen to restrict the focus to
studies involving positive emotions and reward incentives. It is, of
course, also crucial to explore the relationship between negative
emotions and punishment/avoidance-based motivational states,
but as positive and negative emotion may be independent of one
another (Watson et al., 1988), the extent to which they share the
same mechanisms on cognition remains unclear.

POSITIVE AFFECT AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Gray and Braver (2002) postulate that investigations of emotional
inﬂuences on cognitive control should fulﬁll two global aims. The
ﬁrst is to determine whether emotional inﬂuences can and do have
a selective inﬂuence on cognitive control: this must be established
ﬁrst and independently of the nature of these inﬂuences. The second aim is to elucidate the mechanisms by which such inﬂuences
operate. In the present section, we discuss psychological theories
regarding the adaptive value of positive emotion on cognition
as well as theories regarding the speciﬁc mechanisms by which
positive emotion takes its effect.
It has been suggested that positive emotion might be an adaptive signal indicating safety and security in the environment, giving
the organism the freedom to explore and engage in new opportunities (Fredrickson, 2004). Building on this postulation, several
psychological theories have suggested that positive affect serves
to broaden cognition, promote creative problem-solving, and
improve cognitive ﬂexibility. Foundational work in this area was
conducted by Isen and Daubman (1984), who observed that positive affect induction led to broader categorization and facilitated
creative problem-solving (Isen et al., 1987). Relatedly, Fredrickson
(2004) proposed the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions,
which posits that positive emotions broaden one’s repertoire of
thought and action, promoting building of intellectual, social,
and psychological resources. In the cognitive domain, empirical
support for the broaden-and-build theory has come from visual
processing and semantic association tasks suggesting a broader
scope of attention (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). Dovetailing nicely with this work is Carver’s (2003) “coasting hypothesis,”
which suggests that the security of positive affect might emerge
from one’s sensed rate of progress toward goals, and result from
goal completion at a faster rate than anticipated. Under such circumstances, one is free to “coast” on the goal in question and
consider new ideas and/or the pursuit of other goals (leading to
changes in goal prioritization).
The neural mechanisms underlying positive emotion’s effects
on cognition remain unclear. Different theories have been posited
to explain these effects. One inﬂuential theory, the dopaminergic theory of positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999) was developed to
address ﬁndings that positive emotion is linked to broadened cognition. Ashby and colleagues extrapolated from the literature on
the neural substrates of reward processing to propose that the
psychological effects of positive emotion are speciﬁcally linked
to increased dopamine (DA) release (via the substantia nigra
and ventral tegmental area) in these states. The particular cognitive effects of increased DA release during positive affect were
postulated to occur through mesocorticolimbic system projections to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and substantia nigra
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projections to striatum, with increased DA facilitating the ability of ACC and striatum to initiate a switch among active task
sets, rules, or goal representations maintained in lateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC). This facilitation of switching among task-set representations under positive affect enables unusual or non-dominant
sets to become active with a greater probability than under neutral
affect conditions, which then facilitates creative problem-solving.
In connectionist simulations, the account was tested and exhibited
an ability to account for certain behavioral performance patterns
observed by Isen and colleagues under positive affect manipulations (i.e., improved performance on creative problem-solving and
semantic association tasks; Ashby et al., 1999, 2002).
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004), Dreisbach (2006), and Muller
et al. (2007) developed a related theoretical framework, which
emphasizes that the cognitive ﬂexibility associated with positive affect may have systematic costs in addition to the beneﬁts posited by broadening theories. Speciﬁcally, Dreisbach proposed that changes in dopamine activity triggered by positive
affect lead to a shift in the balance between cognitive stability and cognitive ﬂexibility, by increasing the tendency to
update to new task goal representations and decreasing the tendency to perseverate in maintaining old ones. Empirical evidence
from performance in set-shifting and context maintenance paradigms was consistent with this hypothesis, demonstrating positive affect induced facilitation of performance under conditions
that depended on ﬂexibility, but impairment under conditions
stressing maintenance (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach,
2006).
A separate theoretical account, put forward by Gray (2001) and
Gray and Braver (2002), argued for a hemispherically specialized
basis of interactions between positive affect and cognitive control.
In this account, an important congruence is noted between prior
affective research associating positive emotions with increased
activity in the left frontal cortex (Davidson et al., 1990; Davidson,
1992; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Canli et al., 2001), and cognitive
research linking the left frontal cortex to the active maintenance of
verbal information in working memory (D’Esposito et al., 1998;
Smith and Jonides, 1998). The primary theoretical claim of the
account is that different affective states (positive versus negative)
should trigger associated behavioral goals in working memory, and
that it is adaptive for these goals to be hemispherically segregated
such that they can be selectively prioritized by the appropriate
affective state. Thus, the theory postulates that positive affect states
should selectively facilitate verbal working memory – a hypothesis that was conﬁrmed experimentally (Gray, 2001). Nevertheless,
this account is agnostic about why positive and negative affect
would be selectively linked with particular stimulus modalities in
working memory.
In summary, theoretical accounts of the effect of positive emotion on cognition have tended to emphasize inﬂuences on cognitive ﬂexibility, potentially by enhancing updating of goal information in working memory. Although most work has emphasized
the adaptive value of such inﬂuences, it has also been suggested to
come at a cost to goal maintenance. At the level of neural mechanisms, the focus has been on the dopamine system and PFC, which,
as is discussed next, has strong parallels to theoretical accounts
regarding how motivation might modulate cognitive control.
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REWARD MOTIVATION AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Theoretical accounts of motivation suggest a strong linkage to cognitive control (Simon, 1967; Carver and Scheier, 1998; Kruglanski
et al., 2002). Although early motivational theories suggested a
general drive or energization function for motivation (Miller,
1951; Hull, 1952; Duffy, 1962), information processing accounts of
higher-level cognition have instead emphasized that motivational
signals may play a more focused role in the prioritization, updating, and termination of goal representations that provide hierarchical control of behavior (Simon, 1967). Over the last 20 years,
the intrinsic relationship between motivation and goals has been
a central focus of researchers primarily working within the social
and individual differences tradition, based on the central claim
that motivations are expressed primarily as the activation and representation of speciﬁc cognitive and behavioral goals over others
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). More recent work has been geared toward
demonstrating that goal-directed behavior can be primed and
biased by implicit and/or subliminal motivational cues, suggesting a relatively direct route for motivation–cognition interactions
(Bargh et al., 2001; Custers and Aarts, 2010). In particular, Aarts
et al. (2008b) have suggested an affective/motivational account
of goal-pursuit in which positive motivational signals strengthen
goal activation and maintenance, even when this occurs outside of
conscious awareness. More recently, psychological theories postulating the role of motivation in activating goals and guiding
behavior have begun to be bridged with neuroscience-based studies to more clearly specify the mechanisms by which motivation
might inﬂuence cognitive control.
A primary focus of neuroscience studies on motivation and
cognitive control has been to demonstrate that these two processes
are integrated within speciﬁc brain regions, such as the lateral PFC.
Early work involving single-unit recording in primates demonstrated that task-related neuronal activity in PFC was modulated
by the expected reward value associated with performance (Watanabe, 1996; Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Watanabe et al., 2002). In one
compelling demonstration, it was found that reward value directly
enhanced the ﬁdelity of active maintenance in working memory
(Leon and Shadlen, 1999). More recent fMRI studies carried out
in humans have used designs that orthogonally manipulate cognitive control demand and motivational value across a range of
task domains, including working memory (Pochon et al., 2002;
Taylor et al., 2004), context processing (Locke and Braver, 2008;
Kouneiher et al., 2009), task-switching (Savine and Braver, 2010),
and selective attention (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). These studies have conﬁrmed the presence of speciﬁc regions within lateral
PFC (along with effects in other associated regions, such as the
ACC) that are sensitive to the interaction of the two factors, consistent with a speciﬁc role in integrating motivational and cognitive
control functions.
The DA system also plays a central role in accounts of both
motivation and cognitive control. Dopamine has long been
thought to be a critical component of motivation and reward processing (Wise and Rompre, 1989; Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996;
Robbins and Everitt, 1996; Schultz, 1998). More recent accounts
have suggested that DA shows phasic, cue-triggered responses
to speciﬁc events that indicate reward availability (Montague
et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997) and/or high motivational salience
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(Berridge, 2007). This signal, particularly when a reward is different from anticipated (i.e., prediction error), may serve as a mechanism for reward-based associative learning (Schultz et al., 1997;
Schultz, 2002; Arias-Carrion and Poppel, 2007). While the role of
dopamine as a learning versus salience signal in reward has been
debated (Berridge, 2007), both kinds of accounts are compatible
with the idea of phasic DA involvement in processing motivational
incentives and thus consistent with our account. Additionally, a
separate theoretical account has emphasized that the motivational
utility of the current environmental context might be reﬂected in
tonic, rather than phasic, DA activation (Niv et al., 2007). Together,
these accounts suggest DA activity will be increased both by transient cues and sustained contexts that indicate high reward or
motivational value.
It is worth noting a completely separate literature focused
on the inﬂuence of DA release within PFC, which suggests that
the DA system provides modulatory role on cognitive control
functions. Neurophysiological studies in primates show that application of DA into PFC sharpens actively maintained stimulus
representations (Sawaguchi et al., 1988; Sawaguchi and GoldmanRakic, 1991; Arnsten et al., 1994). In contrast, DA antagonists
reduce both active maintenance related PFC activity, and also
cause behavioral impairments in working memory and cognitive
control tasks (Sawaguchi et al., 1990; Sawaguchi and GoldmanRakic, 1994; Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Similar effects
have been observed in human pharmacological and fMRI studies, with DA agonists (administered systemically) being associated
with improvements in working memory and cognitive control, and
leading to associated modulations of PFC activity (Kimberg et al.,
1997; Gibbs and D’Esposito, 2006). It is striking that the effects of
pharmacological manipulations of DA in PFC are so similar to the
effects that have been observed from motivational manipulations
(Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Watanabe et al., 2002).
These linkages between the role of DA and PFC in motivation,
and the effects of DA modulation on PFC-mediated cognitive control functions have prompted the development of theories that
explicitly link these two mechanisms. The gating model account,
put forward by Braver and Cohen (2000), emphasized the importance of phasic DA activity within PFC for the updating and active
maintenance of goal representations. Speciﬁcally, this account
suggests that the phasic DA responses to cues signaling reward
prediction could also be exploited as a means of learning which
task-related information should be actively maintained in PFC,
and when to update such information. Simulation studies demonstrated that a system could in fact learn appropriate updating and
maintenance of task context or goal information based on reward
prediction cues. Thus, this account suggests the possibility of a
linkage between the reward/motivational and cognitive control
functions mediated by DA–PFC interactions. This point was made
even more explicitly in the recent Dual Mechanisms of Control
framework (Braver et al., 2007), which speciﬁcally suggests that
signals of reward motivation will bias cognitive control toward a
“proactive” mode, in which task cues trigger sustained goal activation and maintenance in the service of preparation for anticipated
control demands, via the aforementioned DA–PFC interaction.
Proactive control is distinguished from reactive control, in which
the same task cues only trigger transient control related processes,
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rather than sustained active maintenance, under conditions of
low DA activity, such as when the environmental context is perceived to have reduced motivational value. This account has been
supported by recent experimental evidence from an fMRI study
of motivational inﬂuences on task-switching (Savine and Braver,
2010). Task trials that had high reward value were associated within
increased activity in both lateral PFC and the midbrain DA system.
Moreover, the increased cue-related PFC activation on high reward
trials was associated with behavioral measures of improved task
preparation, supporting the idea of a reward-related shift toward
proactive control.
In summary, investigations of motivation and cognitive control
have primarily focused on the role of goal representations in psychological models, and on interactions of the DA system in PFC
in neuroscience studies. One mechanistic account suggests that
DA activity triggered by reward cues can serve as an updating and
prioritization signal, that modulates active maintenance of goal
information within PFC. The potential similarity of the proposed
mechanisms underlying both positive affect and reward motivation inﬂuences on cognitive control, according to the Ashby model
(i.e., cognitive changes due to increased dopamine release to cortical areas such as the PFC and ACC), is striking, but has not yet
been directly conﬁrmed by experimental studies. This issue is discussed next, followed by suggestions for promising future research
directions.

EMOTION VERSUS MOTIVATION: COMMON OR
DISSOCIABLE INFLUENCES?
Emotion and motivation are closely related constructs, but it is
still not clear how to relate their inﬂuences on cognitive control.
Some theories do not clearly distinguish between the two, while
others more explicitly state that emotion and motivation, while
highly related, remain distinct constructs. Given the state of current evidence, this is still a question calling for clariﬁcation. Hints
of dissociation between the two serve as starting points for future
research.
Most proposals regarding affective inﬂuences on cognitive control have not drawn a clean distinction between emotion and
motivation. This includes Gray’s (2001) hemispheric specialization hypothesis, which explicitly does not distinguish between
positive/negative emotion and approach/avoidance motivation,
and Ashby et al.’s (1999) dopaminergic theory of positive affect,
which posits a relation between DA and positive emotion because
of DA’s involvement in reward processing. Aarts et al. (2008b)
go even further, by explicitly suggesting an equivalence between
positive emotion and reward motivation in terms of their effects
on goal-pursuit and executive control. In their model, positive
affective signals occurring in temporal proximity to activation of
a cognitive goal should strengthen the maintenance, accessibility,
and pursuit of that goal, regardless of whether those affective signals relate to goal attainment (i.e., whether or not they serve as
direct reward motivation cues).
Despite these claims, the relationship between positive affect,
approach motivation, and DA system activity is somewhat tenuous. Experimental studies have shown that affective valence (positive/negative) and motivational direction (approach/avoidance)
can be dissociated (Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones and
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Gable, 2009). Likewise, in Carver’s (2006) theoretical model,
positive and negative affect emerge from detection of the rate
of progress toward fulﬁlling either approach or avoidancerelated goals: positive emotions result from above-anticipated
goal progress; negative emotions result from below-anticipated
goal progress. Thus, positive affect could potentially arise while
pursuing avoidance-motivational goals. Finally, in Berridge’s
neuroscience-based account, dopamine is only critical for the
transfer of motivational salience, or stimulus-triggered “wanting”
to new cues or events, and does not generate hedonic experience, or “liking” (which is thought to be represented in the
ventral pallidum via neurochemicals such as opiates and endocannabinoids; Berridge, 2007; Berridge et al., 2009). Thus, without
supportive direct evidence, links between positive affect, approach
motivation, and DA system activity should not be assumed.
Deconfounding emotional and motivational inﬂuences from
one another is a challenge for exploring and clarifying these
relationships. We argue that, as a starting point, emotional and
motivational manipulations need to be operationalized (i.e., with
exposure to emotional stimuli during or just prior to the task,
or motivational performance-contingent incentives, respectively)
and examined with performance-independent measures. Examining psychophysiological signatures of these inﬂuences [e.g., startle
reﬂex, facial electromyography (EMG)] that have been linked
to valence but not motivational orientation of affective experiences (Cacioppo et al., 1986; Lang et al., 1990) may be useful in
dissociating these inﬂuences from one another.
Although these inﬂuences have yet to be directly disentangled,
independent empirical work from the emotion and motivation
literatures indirectly hints that these are dissociable inﬂuences.
While several theories have proposed that positive emotion can
lead to cognitive broadening and ﬂexibility (Isen et al., 1987; Ashby
et al., 1999; Fredrickson, 2004; Rowe et al., 2007) and exploration
of alternate goals (Carver, 2003), growing evidence suggests that
reward incentives enhance goal maintenance/representation and
inﬂuence proactive cognitive control (Savine and Braver, 2010;
Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Empirical evidence is mixed, suggesting that positive emotion and reward may have similar effects on
some cognitive processes, such as task-switching (reducing switch
costs; Yan-Mei and De-Jun, 2008; Savine et al., 2010), opposite
effects on other processes, such as selective attention (Rowe et al.,
2007; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011) and mixed results on yet other
processes such as goal maintenance (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004;
Dreisbach, 2006; Aarts et al., 2008b; Locke and Braver, 2008). How
these diverging effects relate has yet to be systematically clariﬁed, since positive affect and reward motivation have not yet been
directly examined and compared.
Nevertheless, there is at least one example from the literature
in which the same experimental paradigm – the AX continuous
performance task (AX-CPT; Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992;
Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996; Braver et al., 2001) – has been utilized
(in separate studies) to explore the effects of positive affect and
reward motivation on cognitive control. The AX-CPT is a potentially advantageous paradigm for this purpose, because it permits
selective examination of goal maintenance capability and proactive
control. However, surprisingly, the results of the positive affect and
reward motivation studies appear to be somewhat different. Under
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positive affect induction via valenced pictures displayed prior to
each trial, participants showed evidence of reduced maintenance
capability relative to neutral affect (Dreisbach, 2006). Conversely,
under manipulations of reward motivation, participants showed
evidence of enhanced maintenance capability relative to baseline
(Locke and Braver, 2008). In both studies, the results were interpreted as arising from modulation of DA activity in PFC, but
it is not clear if the two different manipulations actually led to
similar or distinct effects within these brain systems. Thus, direct
comparisons are clearly needed, with monitoring of neural activity, to determine whether there is a potential dissociation between
positive affect and reward motivation effects on goal maintenance.
One possibility that is worth considering is that DA activity
in PFC underlies both positive affect-related reduction in maintenance capability and reward-related increases in maintenance
capability, but that the two effects reﬂect dissociable temporal
dynamics of DA inﬂuence. In particular, it is well-accepted that
DA activity should be considered in terms of both tonic and phasic components, which can interact with each other (Grace, 1991).
Further, prior research has more strongly linked facilitation of goal
maintenance with tonic DA activation in PFC, primarily via D1
receptors; in contrast, phasic DA activity in PFC may promote
updating and cognitive ﬂexibility, potentially via D2 receptors
(Cohen et al., 2002; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Durstewitz and
Seamans, 2008). Thus, distinctions between reward motivation
and positive affect may reﬂect a distinction in the balance between
tonic versus phasic DA activation and/or a D1 versus D2 dominated state. However, the relationship between emotional and
motivational processes and differential temporal dynamics of DA
activity has not been directly shown and has yet to be investigated.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The constructs of emotion and motivation are closely interrelated,
and typically their inﬂuences on cognition have not been explicitly
separated from one another (e.g., Pessoa, 2009). However, in the
light of accumulating evidence suggesting they may be dissociable, their inﬂuences on cognition must be clariﬁed. As alluded to
above, there are unresolved questions in this domain that provide
promising routes for future investigation. Here we discuss some
of these in greater detail.
A ﬁrst, straightforward suggestion is for studies to be conducted that directly test and compare the effects of positive affect
manipulations with those involving reward motivation within a
single sample, and using closely matched experimental designs.
Of course, this suggestion does beg the question of what exactly
differentiates a positive affect manipulation from one involving
reward motivation, especially since some studies advertised as
examining positive affect have actually used manipulations involving delivery of rewards (Isen et al., 1987; van Steenbergen et al.,
2009). Although this question is one that may involve a deeper
discussion that is outside of the scope of this article, we want to
highlight that this issue has not really been adequately considered by researchers working in this area. Nevertheless, it is at least
possible to operationalize a distinction in which positive affect is
manipulated by inﬂuences such as mood inductions or strongly
valenced stimuli, whereas reward motivation is manipulated by
varying the incentives provided for task-performance.
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With such an approach, it would be possible to directly test
the hypothesis that positive emotion promotes cognitive ﬂexibility while reward incentives promote greater goal maintenance.
As mentioned previously, cognitive paradigms that speciﬁcally
probe active maintenance and proactive control, such as the AXCPT, could be used with emotional and motivational experimental
manipulations to probe the possibility of dissociable versus common behavioral effects and/or their associated physiological bases.
Other paradigms should also be examined, such as the remote
associates and global/local paradigms, that have been frequently
and fruitfully examined to demonstrate increased cognitive ﬂexibility under positive affect (Isen and Daubman, 1984; Fredrickson
and Branigan, 2005; Rowe et al., 2007), but have not previously
been studied with respect to reward motivation. Finally, the use of
a common paradigm would be useful for exploring other hypotheses relating to positive affect and/or reward motivation such as
Carver’s coasting model. Unfortunately, this model has not previously been studied within cognitive experimental paradigms,
so further work in how to operationalize maintained goal-pursuit
versus goal-switching would need to occur (e.g., via exploration of
potentially approach paradigms such as volitional task-switching).
A second promising direction for future research is a more
direct examination of the role of neurotransmitter systems in
mediating affective and motivational inﬂuences on cognitive control. This is especially important with regards to the effects of
positive emotion on cognition, since theories such as Ashby’s
posit a neurotransmitter mechanism without direct evidence for
its involvement. Study of the role of neurotransmitter systems
in positive affect is somewhat challenging, since detecting positive affect in animal models is difﬁcult (although potentially not
impossible, e.g., Berridge, 2000), as is direct monitoring of neurotransmitter activity in humans. However, studies that examine
state-related changes in neurotransmitter receptor binding (e.g.,
using PET radioligand-labeling methods and dynamic imaging
approaches) do provide a promising avenue for this research,
especially for the monitoring of DA system activation (Egerton
et al., 2009). In particular, receptor binding studies may provide
a powerful means of directly testing whether increases in positive
affect are associated with increases in DA system activity. Pharmacological manipulations provide another method by which to
examine the link between neurotransmitter activity and cognitive change. Pharmacological challenge studies involving agents
that inﬂuence DA activity have been used fruitfully in a range of
domains to understand the role of this system in cognitive functions such as working memory (e.g., Cools et al., 2007), as well as
in mediating basic aspects of reward processing (e.g., Pessiglione
et al., 2006). Thus, targeted studies are needed that directly investigate how pharmacological manipulation of this system impacts
motivational versus affective effects on cognitive control.
Although dopamine has received much attention for its involvement in reward and cognitive control processes, other neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine (NE) may also play crucial roles.
NE activity, historically linked to physiological arousal (Foote et al.,
1980), is becoming increasingly appreciated as a complex and speciﬁc mediator in the control of behavior as well (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). The locus coeruleus (LC)-NE system may play a critical role in the regulation of exploitation (i.e., optimizing current
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task-performance) and exploration (i.e., disengagement in search
of alternative behaviors) tendencies during task-oriented behavior – phasic and tonic NE activity may respectively reﬂect these
control tendencies; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). It may be that
exploration is highly analogous to Carver’s (2003) idea of “coasting” or that the exploitation–exploration balance is analogous
to the maintenance-ﬂexibility balance discussed with regard to
dopamine and control (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Muller et al.,
2007), but connections between these bodies of work have yet to
be made. In particular, it is still not well understood what the relative roles of dopamine and norepinephrine are in emotional and
motivational interactions with cognition. Exciting new evidence
suggests that pupil dilation can be used as a non-invasive marker
of LC-NE activity in humans, with pupil dilation changes indexing
shifts in the exploitation–exploration balance during performance
of cognitive control tasks (Gilzenrat et al., 2010). Thus, pupillometric methods might be one promising avenue for exploring the
role of the LC-NE system in affective versus motivational inﬂuences in cognitive control, along with the psychopharmacological
and neurotransmitter imaging methods described above.
More generally, the use of psychophysiological measures may
provide another approach by which possible dissociations between
emotional and motivational inﬂuences on cognition can be investigated. Pupil dilation has been well-established to index fairly
speciﬁc changes in cognitive demand and effort (Beatty, 1982;
Granholm et al., 1996; Beatty and Lucero-Wagoner, 2000) and thus
may provide a measure of cognitive control, independent from
behavior, that can ﬁnely index changes in temporal control dynamics. For example, pupil dilation has been successfully utilized to
examine the temporal dynamics of goal maintenance and proactive versus reactive control within the AX-CPT paradigm (related
to developmental changes; e.g., Chatham et al., 2009). Additionally, pupil dilation is sensitive to emotional variables as well, and
may reﬂect emotional arousal (Bradley et al., 2008). Thus, pupillometric methods might be exceptionally well-suited for examining
interactions of affective/motivational systems and cognitive control, although such interactions have almost never been explored
(e.g., Satterthwaite et al., 2007). Other psychophysiological indices
might be promising as well in this regard – skin conductance
(SCR), startle probes, and EMG are all well-established autonomic
indicators of affective state (Bradley et al., 2001). Thus, comparison of the effects of affective versus motivational manipulations
on these indicators might help to reveal potential dissimilarities in autonomic proﬁle, as well as whether some indicators
serve as better predictors of the cognitive control effects of such
manipulations.
Another means by which to probe for distinctions between
emotion and motivation might be to more clearly assess the role
of subjective experience. Subjective experience is thought to be a
core ingredient to the construct of emotion (Barrett et al., 2007),
but it remains unclear whether it should be considered key to
the construct of motivation as well. Recent evidence suggests that
subliminally presented reward cues can lead to similar effects on
behavior and cognitive control as stimuli that are consciously perceived (Aarts et al., 2008a; Bijleveld et al., 2010; Zedelius et al.,
2010), suggesting that subjective awareness of motivational value
is not critical. In the emotion realm, subliminal information has
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been shown to inﬂuence affective preference (Zajonc, 1980), and
non-emotional facial changes (i.e., to a smile-like position) have
been associated with changes in emotional response (Strack et al.,
1988). However, subliminal presentation of positively valenced
stimuli seems to only impact motivated behaviors such as the
amount consumed and willingness-to-pay for rewards, but not
subjectively experienced affective responses such as positive mood
or reward liking (Winkielman et al., 2005). Thus, it is not clear
whether subliminal manipulations of positive affect would impact
cognitive control in the same manner as manipulations that are
subjectively experienced.
As a ﬁnal consideration, the relationship between emotion and
motivation could be explored by examining the effect these manipulations have on each other. Some evidence suggests that reward
incentives promote positive mood (Meloy et al., 2006), but such
research is relatively sparse and, to our knowledge, effects of emotion on the effectiveness of a motivational manipulation remains
unknown.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
While emotion and motivation have been assumed to be related,
they have largely been investigated independently with relation to
cognitive control. Research in both areas may beneﬁt from greater
theoretical and empirical integration. Current theories suggest
that the inﬂuences of positive emotion and reward incentives may
depend on a common neuroanatomy: both may increase midbrain dopaminergic activity (i.e., ventral tegmental area), which
projects to control-associated areas, such as the PFC and the ACC.
The PFC in particular has received attention as a potential integration site for task and affective information in both emotional
and motivational lines of research.
Despite these parallels, many research questions remain to
be addressed. Perhaps most fundamentally, the neurobiological
mechanism, independent of reward, by which positive emotion
inﬂuences cognition remain unclear. Speciﬁcally, there is as of yet
no direct evidence that supports a model in which positive emotion, independent of other components of reward, is associated
with dopamine activity. Clarifying this mechanism will be key
to establishing whether positive emotion and reward motivation
inﬂuences on cognitive control are common or distinct. Second, further exploration of differential contributions of tonic and
phasic activity in both the DA system and other relevant neurotransmitter systems, such as LC-NE, could help characterize both
emotional and motivational inﬂuences on cognition, especially
in probing further the hypothesis that positive affect and reward
might be associated with more reactive and proactive (and/or
exploratory versus exploitative) modes of cognitive processing,
respectively. Third, inclusion of both psychophysiological measures and assessment/manipulation of subjective experience may
be beneﬁcial in theoretically distinguishing constructs of emotion from motivation and improving understanding of how they
impact cognition. Fourth, effects of emotion and motivation on
one another should be probed to help clarify their relationship.
Emotions may be characterized as emergent from one’s current
status relative to one’s optimal goal status (Carver, 2006; Lang and
Bradley, 2008). Thus, while emotion and motivation are closely
related, emotions as an evaluator of goal status serve a slightly
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different functional purpose than motivations, and consequently
may be more ﬂuid in relation to any given goal. Accordingly, they
may have a more variable inﬂuence on cognitive control relative
to motivational inﬂuences, which serve to optimize goal-relevant
processing directly. Clarifying these constructs will help unite

disparate lines of research within a common theoretical framework, and provide a more nuanced picture of these interactions
and their complexities. By doing so, this research effort may help
to signiﬁcantly advance the emerging ﬁeld of affect–cognition
interactions.
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